| 就在中國向美國敞開大門，以及民主運動積極分子挑戰共產黨的統治權威之際，臺灣也邁入新的繁榮階段，並積極重新追尋自己未來前途的定位。根據一九七九年中美關係正常化的官方聲明，中國共產黨對外做出如下的宣稱：
|
The opening up of
China to the United States, and the challenge to Communist government
authority posed by the Democracy movement activists, occurred
as Taiwan was entering a new era of prosperity and struggling
to redefine its own future. In their official statement on "normalization"
of relations with the United States in 1979, the Chinese Communists
had made this declaration:
|
眾所周知，中華人民共和國政府是中國的唯一合法政府，臺灣是中國的一部分。臺灣問題曾經是阻礙中美兩國實現關係正常化的關鍵問題。根據上海公報的精神，經過中美雙方的共同努力，現在這個問題在中美兩國之間得到解決，從而使中美兩國人民熱切期望的關係正常化得以實現。至於解決臺灣歸回祖國、完成國家統一的方式，這完全是中國的內政。 |
As is known to all, the Government
of the PRC is the sole legal government of China and Taiwan
is a part of China. The question of Taiwan was the crucial
issue obstructing the normalization of relations between China
and the USA. It has now been resolved between the two countries
in the spirit of the Shanghai communique and through their
joint efforts, thus enabling the normalization of relations
so ardently desired by the people of the two countries. As
for the wav of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the
motherland and reunifying the country, it is entirely China's
internal affair. |
| 但是美國政府聲明的調子卻與中共迥然相異，因為在美國官方聲明中，另外提及有關臺灣與美國外交關係的結束，以及臺灣與美國共同防禦條約的終止。美國的聲明中也宣佈，在與中國簽訂條約之後，美國將自一九七九年一月一日起，之後四個月內撤出在臺灣的餘留軍事人員。有關臺灣前途的問題方面，雖然美國與中國共同宣佈，美國承認（recognized）「中華人民共和國是中國的唯一合法政府」，在聲明的其他段落裡美國也詳細說明這對臺灣的意義：
|
The U.S. statement
had a different flavor, since it included additional sections
concerning the termination of diplomatic relations with Taiwan
and the cancellation of the mutual-defense treaty between Taiwan
and the United State. It also declared that the United States
would withdraw its remaining military personnel from Taiwan
within four months of the January 1, 1979, signing of the agreement
with China. On the question of Taiwan's future, the United States
had joined with China in declaring that it recognized ''the
Government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China,"
although it elaborated what this meant for Taiwan in a separate
passage:
|
今後，美國人民和臺灣人民將在沒有官方政府代表機構，也沒有外交關係的情況下保持商務、文化和其他關係……。
美國深信，臺灣人民將有一個和平與繁榮的未來。美國繼續關心臺灣問題的和平解決，並期望臺灣問題將由中國人自己和平地加以解決。
|
In the
future, the American people and the people of Taiwan will
maintain commercial, cultural, and other relations without
official government representation and without diplomatic
relations.....
The USA is confident that the people of Taiwan face a
peaceful and prosperous future. The USA continues to have
an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue
and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully
by the Chinese themselves." |
| 唯有臺灣係屬於中國的一部分，亦即作為暫時脫離母國的一個行省，中華人民共和國主張「解決臺灣歸回祖國」是「中國的內政」的聲明才有實質的意義。事實上，至今臺灣仍宣稱其政府代表全體中國人，而自一九四九年以降臺灣的發展進程，以一種獨樹一幟的模式，使臺灣蛻變成一個具備特殊經濟、政治結構的獨立社會。
|
The PRC statement
that "bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland"
was "China's internal affair" made sense only if Taiwan was
considered part of China, a province that had temporarily lost
its home. In fact, although Taiwan still claimed that its government
represented the Chinese people, its course of development since
1949 had made it, in important ways, a fully independent society
with its own economic and political structures.
|
| 中、美關係正常化之時，臺灣的總人口數是一千七百一十萬人，佔中華人民共和國估算之九億五千萬人口的百分之一點八。但一九七九年當時臺灣的人均國民生產毛額約為中華人民共和國的六倍，一九五二至一九七九年間，臺灣的人均國民生產毛額成長為百分之四百一十六。這樣的非凡成就並非一蹴可幾，最初，臺灣的成長受惠於美國的大力協助，尤其是通過「農村復興聯合委員會」，而農復會在一九五○年代的主要功能是督導土地減租、土地出售等計畫的實施，以扶持臺灣的自耕農。基本上這些計畫的成功推展，裨益於臺灣控制同四○年代中國大陸一般惡化的通貨膨脹問題。把新、舊臺幣的兌換率固定為一比四萬，臺灣於一九四九年成功實施了貨幣改革政策（其結果不似一九四七年在中國大陸上金圓券改革的慘痛經驗），而貨幣改革的成功，大部分歸因於臺灣領土面積比較小，所以能輕而易舉地監督、管制黃金的交易。一九四九年約為百分之三千四百的通貨膨脹率，迄至一九五○年已降低為百分之三○六，一九五一年為百分之六十六，而自一九五二年之後，下降為平均每年百分之八點八。截至一九六一年，臺灣的通貨膨脹率已降低至百分之三。
|
At the time of the
normalization announcements, Taiwan's population stood at 17.1
million, 1.8 percent of the PRC's estimated population of 950
million. Yet Taiwan's per capita GNP by 1979 was around six
times that of the PRC, having risen 416 percent between 1952
and 1979. This growth had not been easy to achieve, and had
initially been carefully fostered by the United States, especially
through the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, which
in the 1950s supervised a land-rent-reduction program and a
land-sale program to help owner-cultivators in Taiwan. Essential
to the success of these programs was control of the hyper inflation
that had afflicted Taiwan along with China in the 1940s. The
substitution of a new currency in Taiwan, at an exchange rate
of 40,000 yuan of the old currency for $1 of the new, was carried
through successfully in 1949 (unlike the disastrous gold-yuan
experiments in 1947 on the mainland), in large part because
Taiwan's comparatively small size made it possible to check
speculation and control gold sales. A 1949 inflation rate of
around 3,400 percent was reduced to 306 percent in 1950, 66
percent in 1951, and from 1952 onward dropped slowly to an annual
rate of 8.8 percent. By 1961 it had been forced down to 3 percent.
|
| 起初，臺灣方面在控制通貨膨脹時所運用的操作技術與中華人民共和國雷同。臺灣政府把儲蓄率固定為百分之十，並嚴格控制貨幣流通等政策，得以牢牢控制新貨幣的流量。在「耕者有其田」政策方針下，臺灣政府把國營企業的股票分配給地主，以補償其土地的損失；另一方面，佃農只要在十年內按照國家規定的定額繳交糧食，就授予佃農目前耕種土地的所有權。不過臺灣是一黨專政，權力是由追隨蔣介石主導之國民黨撤退至臺灣的二百萬大陸流亡者所壟斷，是故在推動改革政策時並不存在相應所需的民主程序。
|
The techniques used
to battle inflation were initially not wholly dissimilar to
those used in the PRC. By instituting interest rates on savings
of around 10 percent and controlling specie circulation, the
government kept a grip on the new currency. Under the Taiwan
government's land-to-the-tiller program, shares in state enterprises
were distributed to farmers to help give them security, and
tenant farmers were promised title to the land they worked if
they contracted to provide the state quota payments of grain
for a decade. Since Taiwan was also a one-party state--controlled
by the approximately 2 million mainland refugees through the
Guomindang, which was still dominated by Chiang Kai-shek--no
democratic process was required to institute these reforms.
|
| 隨著臺灣農產品產量提高到能滿足國內的需求時，政府開始致力於改變一八九五至一九四五年日據時代所建構以米、糖為主要出口產品的經濟形態，轉而以先進工業產品為出口的主要項目。政策轉向所取得的傲人成就，特別是臺灣的出口部門，可以見諸於下表的記載。一九六○年代的經濟主力大部份集中在電子產品和其他技術先進的產品，不過在紡織品與橡膠、化學、塑膠方面亦有驚人的成長。一九七三至一九七四年的世界石油危機，導致過度仰賴石油進口的臺灣經濟飽受劇烈的衝擊，然而在動盪時刻所實施的糧食價格貼補政策，再加上斷然的貨幣措施，使得這場危機不至於釀成巨禍。
|
But as agricultural
production in Taiwan rose encouragingly to meet domestic needs,
the government made a determined effort to shift the economy
from its base in exporting mainly rice and sugar, developed
during the Japanese occupation of 1895 to 1945, to a focus on
advanced industrial production. The results were startling,
especially in Taiwan's export sector, as shown in the table
below (table 1). The economy's focus in the 1960s was largely
on electronics and other technologically advanced industries,
but there was also a dramatic increase in production of textiles,
as well as of rubber, chemicals, and plastics. The 1973-1974
world oil crisis brought serious disruptions to Taiwan's economy,
with its overdependence on oil imports, but food-price subsidies
during the emergency period, coupled with extremely severe monetary
policies, kept the crisis from becoming a catastrophe.
|
- 臺灣的經濟基礎，1953與1962年( Taiwan's
Economic Base, 1953 and 1962 ) -
| |
1953 |
1962 |
就業部門百分比
Percent
of employment |
|
|
農業部門
Agriculture |
61 |
55 |
工業部門
Industry |
9 |
12 |
| 國內生產毛額（GNP）百分比 |
|
|
農業部門
Agriculture |
38 |
29 |
工業部門
Industry |
18 |
26 |
| 出口百分比 |
|
|
農業產品
Agriculture goods
and products |
93 |
49 |
工業產品
Industrial products |
7 |
51 |
|
|
|
| 若以成長率來比較，臺灣與實施五個五年計畫時期的中華人民共和國大致相當，但於後大躍進的經濟混亂時期迅速超越了中華人民共和國，嗣後於文化大革命的失序年代則遙遙領先中華人民共和國。（從有關日本的數據顯示，臺灣在這段期間幾乎趕上日本的成長速率。見下表〔表二〕。） |
In comparison to growth
rates in the PRC, Taiwan's were similar during the mainland's
First Five-Year Plan, but broke away swiftly with the post-Great
Leap Forward economic disruptions, and held that lead during
the years of the Cultural Revolution. (The figures for Japan
show that Taiwan almost matched Japanese growth rates in this
period. See the table below. [table 2])
|
|
成長率：臺灣、中華人民共和國、日本，1952至1972年
Growth Rates: Taiwan, PRC, and Japan, 1952-1972
| |
1952-1960 |
1960-1965 |
1965-1972 |
國民生產毛額成長率百分比
Percentage rates of overall
GNP growth |
|
|
|
| 臺灣 Taiwan |
7.2 |
9.6 |
10.1 |
| 中華人民共和國 PRC |
6.0 |
4.7 |
5.7 |
| 日本 Japan |
8.3 |
9.8 |
10.8 |
人均國民生產毛額成長率百分比
Percentage rates of per
capita GNP growth |
|
|
|
| 臺灣 Taiwan |
3.6 |
6.4 |
7.3 |
| 中華人民共和國 PRC |
3.6 |
2.9 |
3.3 |
| 日本 Japan |
7.2 |
8.8 |
9.5 |
|
|
|
| 臺灣政府盡量對可能損及其收支平衡的產品設下層層限制，尤其是奢侈品或直接與臺灣製造業競爭的產品。反之，國家則通過價廉的出口產品，以及對位於「加工出口區」的企業進行特殊的經濟協助，來積極拓展國外市場。第一個加工出口區在一九六○年創立於高雄港，同時，在美援的支持下，高雄港躍升成為一個貨運吞吐量龐大的港口。直至一九六九年，又增設了兩個加工出口區。在這些區域內，工業園區的行政事務是由一群有效率的官僚來進行管理，以免除政府的行政手續，此外，在園區內外國或臺灣本地的企業均能享有減免租稅，假若企業生產的產品完全以出口為導向，對於企業進口特殊機械設備，還得以享有免除關稅的優惠。
|
As much as it could,
the government on Taiwan had restricted imports of products
that would worsen its balance-of-payments problems, especially
products that could be considered luxury goods or competed directly
with Taiwanese manufactures. But the state actively promoted
exports by making cheap credit available to manufacturers of
export goods, and by giving
these firms special economic support in a series of export processing
zones. The first of these was established in 1966 at the
southern Taiwan port of
Kaohsiung, which had been developed into an active harbor with
U.S. aid. Two more such zones were established in 1969.
In these zones, industrial
parks were supervised by a streamlined bureaucracy to avoid
government red tape, and both foreign and Taiwanese firms were
given tax incentives and exemptions from import duties on special
machinery if they exported all their finished products.
|
| 即使一九七二年〈上海公報〉的簽訂，並未對臺灣的經濟榮景造成決定性的影響，但公報宣佈之前未能事先知會蔣氏政府的作法，的確讓臺灣十分難堪。當臺灣把這樣的外交羞辱與臺灣任聯合國喪失席位聯想在一起，慍怒與遭背棄的激憤之情達到沸騰。一九七一至一九七二年期間，臺灣爆發反美的騷亂，加上對蔣氏政權的專擅、國民黨政府代表性的闕如、生活領域中對個人自由的箝制等等的抗議，使得局勢更加不安。蘊含在這種不滿情緒之中的是佔絕大多數人口的受壓迫群體──一九四五年前即遷居該島的漢人──其內心深處的無力感，以及他們對一九四九年之後自大陸撤退至臺灣的外省人霸佔權力位置的憤慨。在這兩大群體之間，從婚姻形態到教育方式，都有相當的差異，而使得嚴重的暴力衝突可能一觸即發。蔣氏政府唯恐動亂的蔓延可能進一步鼓舞尚屬襁褓狀態、卻目標鮮明的臺灣獨立運動順勢坐大，而危及國民黨的權力。國民黨以綿密的警力與嚴厲的政治控制，若是有必要，再輔之以優勢軍力，來鎮壓內部的異議分子。中華人民共和國受困於本身內部的跌宕起伏，此時並無能力從中加深臺灣島內的裂痕，以遂行其政治目的。
|
Although the Shanghai
communique of 1972 did not decisively affect Taiwan's economic
status, the absence of any consultations with Chiang's
government prior to its announcement was humiliating. And when
the Taiwanese pondered this humiliation along with the loss
of Taiwan's UN
seat, their sense of anger and rejection mounted. Anti-U. S.
riots erupted in Taiwan during 1971-1972, fed as well by protests
against the ossified Chiang regime, the unrepresentative nature
of the Guomindang government, and the severe restrictions on
individual freedom that were still a part of Taiwan life. Underlying
the discontent was the feeling of powerlessness that oppressed
the majority of the population--those Chinese who had settled
on the island before 1945 and had continued to resent the occupation
by post-1949 refugees from the mainland. Acute differences between
these two constituencies spilled over into everything from marriage
patterns to education, and there was a distinct possibility
of serious violence. Chiang's government feared that the widespread
protests might encourage the growth of the small but articulate
Taiwan Independence movement, a potential threat to Guomindang
power. But the Guomindang was able to suppress domestic dissent
through strict police and political control, which could be
backed, when necessary, by overwhelming military force. Torn
by its own
troubles, the PRC was not able to exploit Taiwan's divisions
for political ends.
|
| 無論如何，一九七九年卡特與鄧小平二人達成關係正常化的協議，對臺灣而言更具威脅，至少看在美國國內那些國民黨支持者眼裡是如此。蔣介石於一九七五年溘逝，蔣介石之子蔣經國繼承臺灣總統的職權，有人擔心蔣經國欠缺統治臺灣的必要威望。美國終止與臺灣的所有官式外交關係，這意味著雙方關係只能通過一在臺北、另一在華府設立的兩個「協會」來進行，儘管這兩個協會的行政人員係由已不在其位的職業外交官充任。就臺灣的支持者而言，特別令人惶惶不安的是美國政府預計在四個月內撤回臺灣島上的所有美方軍事人員，終止美國與臺灣的共同防禦條約，並與中華人民共和國達成協議，不再提供臺灣新式的防禦武器，逐步減少對臺灣的軍售。
|
The 1979 Carter-Deng
normalization agreements, however, seemed more threatening to
Taiwan--at least in the eyes of Guomindang supporters in
the United States. Chiang Kai-shek had died in 1975, and though
his son Chiang Ching-kuo inherited the island's presidency,
there was concern that he might not have the prestige to hold
Taiwan together. The ending of all official American diplomatic
concourse with Taiwan meant that henceforth relations would
be conducted only through two "institutes," one in Taipei and
one in Washington, D.C., although these were staffed mainly
by professional foreign-service personnel considered to be on
leave during their assignments. Particularly threatening, in
the eyes of Taiwan's supporters, were the U.S. offer to withdraw
all its military personnel from the island
within four months, the abrogation of the mutual-security treaty,
and the agreement reached with the PRC by which the United States
would not supply new offensive arms to Taiwan and would gradually
reduce overall military support.
|
| 局勢進展的結果導致美國國會於一九七九年四月通過〈臺灣關係法〉（Taiwan
Relations Act），在這項法案中，親臺勢力藉由重申美國對臺灣的承諾，反映出他們內心潛藏的憂慮，特別是該法案凸顯「臺灣的前途將通過和平方式決定」，中華人民共和國針對臺灣所採取的任何「抵制或禁運」視同是對「西太平洋和平與安全的威脅」。再者，國會進一步強調向「臺灣提供防禦性武器」，堅決反對會「危及臺灣人民的安全或社會、經濟制度的任何訴諸武力的行為或其他強制性形式的能力。」真正令卡特總統感到欣慰的是，該法案聲言美國將同時致力於「維護並促進全體臺灣人民的人權」。
|
The result was that
in April 1979 Congress passed a strong. Taiwan Relations Act
that reflected the worries of pro-Taiwan forces by reaffirming
the U. S. commitment to Taiwan, and especially by underlining
that "the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means."
and that any "boycotts and embargoes" by the PRC against Taiwan
would be considered a "threat to the peace and security of the
Western Pacific." Furthermore, Congress emphatically undertook
"to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character," and
pledged to "resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion
that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic
system, of the people on Taiwan." The only real sop to the broader-based
Carter position on China was the statement in the act that the
United States would also work for the "preservation and enhancement
of the human rights of all the people in Taiwan."
|
| 臺灣在一九七九年失去美國的外交承認，但是經濟發展並未受到重創。反之，一九七九年是臺灣經濟發展最強勁的一年，國民生產毛額成長百分之二十點三，總值高達三百二十億美元。儘管基於實用動機的考量，臺灣降低對美貿易依賴的程度，但在同年，臺灣與一百二十個國家的外貿總量成長了百分之三十一。臺灣的外資總額亦成長迅速，從一九七八年的二億一千三百萬美元至一九七九年的三億二千九百萬美元，增加逾百分之五十。對進口石油過度依賴仍是臺灣所面臨的主要問題，臺灣每日需進口石油三十八萬桶，每年耗費逾二十億美元；不過臺灣核能發電能力的拓展，或多或少緩和了對進口石油過度依賴的問題。（一九八○年，臺灣喪失了在「國際貨幣基金」〔International
Monetary Fund〕、「世界銀行」〔World Bank〕的席位，由中華人民共和國取而代之，但這對臺灣的經濟發展並無明顯的負面影響。）
|
In the event, the
loss of U. S. diplomatic recognition in 1979 did not affect
the Taiwanese economy adversely. On the contrary, 1979 proved
to be an exceedingly strong year as Taiwan's GNP grew by 20.3
percent to an all-time peak of $32 billion. Although Taiwan
cut back its reliance on U. S. trade to some extent--which was
in any case a practical move--overall trade, conducted with
120 different countries, rose 31 percent the same year. Foreign
investment in Taiwan also rose dramatically--by over 50 percent,
from $213 million in 1978 to $329 million in 1979. Taiwan's
main problem continued to be its dependence on oil imports,
which at 380,000 barrels a day cost Taiwan over $2 billion a
year; but the expansion of the island's nuclear-power facilities
promised to offset this problem to some extent. (In 1980 Taiwan
lost both its International Monetary Fund and its World Bank
seats to the PRC, but this also had no apparent adverse effect
on the economy.)
|
| 中華人民共和國領導人也知道臺灣經濟的繁榮，他們漸漸認清，無論他們口中所發出的「統一」語彙是何等義正辭嚴，只要雙方的經濟落差過大，那麼統一就沒有指望。下表（表三之一、三之二）是一九七○年代中期上海與臺北兩地工人在食物、衣著、消費性產品方面購買能力的比較。該表顯示，臺北產品價格佔工人所得的百份比，一般遠低於上海。據此，臺灣工人幾乎人人擁有充足的購買能力，但中華人民共和國卻必須補貼城市居民的糧食支出。此外，再根據上海與臺北每月家庭預算的比較，兩地在糧食支出佔全部所得百分比方面近乎相等，這意味著臺北工人的購買力優於上海工人。雖然欠缺更嚴謹的統計數據支撐，但這樣的結論亦是顯而易見的。相較之下，臺灣工人的所得支出比例大部分集中在住房與醫療照顧上。
|
The leaders of the
PRC were aware of Taiwan's prosperity, and slowly began to realize
that however strong their rhetoric concerning "reunification"
might be, there was no realistic expectation for it whatever
if the economic disparities between the two countries remained
as broad as they were. The table follows (table 3-1, 3-2) compares
the purchasing power of Shanghai and Taipei workers for food,
clothing, and consumer goods in the mid-1970s. It shows that
as a percentage of workers' income product prices in Taipei
(Taiwan's Capital) were generally lower than n Shanghai. The
Taiwanese worker was almost invariably able to afford to purchase
more, despite attempts in the PRC to subsidize food prices for
city dwellers. Since a comparison of monthly family budgets
in Shanghai and Taipei shows that roughly the same percentage
of total income was spent on food, the implication is that workers
in Taipei ate far better than their counterparts in Shanghai--something
apparent without the aid of statistics to most casual observers.
Housing and health care, in comparison, absorbed a higher percentage
of the Taiwan workers' earnings.
|
|
上海與臺灣消費力的比較，1970年代中期
- COMPARATIVE PURCHASING POER IN SHANGHAI AND TAIPEI, MID-1970s
-
| |
所得價格
* Income
price* |
| |
價格
Price---------------------------------------------------- |
| 項目 Item |
上海(人民幣)
Shanghai (SH yuan) |
臺北(新臺幣)
Taipei (NT$) |
上海 (%)
SH (%) |
臺北 (%)
TP (%) |
上海 / 臺北
SH/TP |
| 食物
Food |
|
|
|
|
|
米 (公斤)
Rice (kg.) |
0.28 |
16.90 |
1.04 |
0.88 |
1.18 |
麥粉 (公斤)
Wheat flour (kg.) |
0.28 |
13.30 |
1.04 |
0.69 |
1.51 |
豬肉 (公斤)
Pork (kg.) |
1.80 |
78.00 |
6.67 |
4.04 |
1.65 |
雞肉 (公斤)
Chicken (kg.) |
2.50 |
110.00 |
9.26 |
5.70 |
1.62 |
魚 (公斤)
Fish (cherapest)(kg.) |
0.44 |
37.00 |
1.63 |
1.92 |
0.85 |
雞蛋 (公斤)
Hen eggs (kg.) |
1.60 |
35.50 |
5.93 |
1.84 |
3.22 |
白糖 (公斤)
White sugar (kg.) |
1.45 |
15.80 |
5.37 |
0.82 |
6.56 |
醬油 (公斤)
Soy sauce (kg.) |
0.54 |
16.70 |
2.00 |
0.86 |
2.31 |
鹽 (公斤)
Salt (kg.)v |
0.28 |
5.00 |
1.04 |
0.26 |
4.00 |
馬鈴薯 (公斤)
Potatoes (kg.) |
0.06 |
12.80 |
0.22 |
0.66 |
0.34 |
蔥
Scallions |
0.15 |
10.00 |
0.56 |
0.52 |
1.07 |
豆腐 (公斤)
Bean curd (kg.) |
0.52 |
12.50 |
1.93 |
0.65 |
2.97 |
紅豆 (公斤)
Read beans (kg.) |
0.11 |
18.30 |
0.41 |
0.95 |
0.43 |
包心菜 (公斤)
Bok choy (cabbage)
(kg.) |
0.06 |
15.00 |
0.22 |
0.78 |
0.29 |
| 衣著
Clothing |
|
|
|
|
|
襪子 (公尺；雙)
Socks (m.; pr.) |
2.50 |
16.00 |
9.26 |
0.83 |
11.17 |
多元酯襯衫 (公尺)
Polyester shirt (m.) |
6.00 |
150.00 |
22.22 |
7.77 |
2.86 |
棉夾克 (公尺)
Cotton jacket (m.) |
12.50 |
240.00 |
46.30 |
12.43 |
3.72 |
塑膠拖鞋 (雙)
Plastic sandals (pr.) |
4.50 |
35.00 |
16.67 |
1.81 |
9.19 |
運動鞋 (雙)
Sneakers (m.; pr.) |
9.50 |
130.00 |
35.19 |
6.74 |
5.22 |
外套 (公尺)
Cloth coat (w.) |
66.00 |
400.00 |
244.44 |
20.72 |
11.80 |
| 消費品
Consumer goods |
|
|
|
|
|
腳踏車
Bicycle |
120.00 |
2,400.00 |
444.44 |
124.25 |
3.57 |
籃球
Basketball |
15.00 |
280.00 |
55.56 |
14.51 |
3.83 |
電風扇
Electric fan |
179.00 |
864.00 |
662.96 |
44.76 |
14.81 |
電子時鐘
Electric clock |
19.00 |
683.00 |
70.37 |
35.39 |
1.99 |
洗衣機
Sewing machine |
150.00 |
2,725.00 |
555.56 |
141.18 |
3.93 |
電視機 (11吋)
Television (11") |
700.00 |
5,000.00 |
2,592.59 |
259.05 |
10.01 |
電晶體收音機
Transistor radio |
30.00 |
320.00 |
111.11 |
16.58 |
6.70 |
|
*「所得價格」（Income price）係指消費一單位所需之每月人均所得的百分比。上海每月所得是人民幣二十七元，臺北是新臺幣一九三○點一○元。「上海／臺北」是指上海與臺北所得價格的比率。
* "Income price" is the percentage
of monthly per capita income needed to purchase
one unit. Monthly income figures are 27
yuan for Shanghai and NT$1,930.10 for Taipei.
"SH/TP" is the ratio of income
prices between Shanghai and Taipei. |
|
|
|
|
上海、臺北每月家庭預算分配，1970年代中期
- ALLOCATION OF MONTHLY FAMILY BUDGET IN SHANGHAI AND TAIPEI,
MID-1970S -
| 項 目 |
上
海 |
臺
北 |
| 食物 Food |
38.55% |
36.24% |
| 衣著 Clothing |
15.06 |
4.30 |
| 住房 Housing |
5.62 |
17.54 |
| 家具 Furniture |
5.95 |
2.05 |
| 公用支出 Utilities |
5.30 |
4.38 |
| 醫療 Medical |
1.20 |
3.25 |
| 教育 Education |
4.22 |
4.25 |
| 交通 Transportation |
6.02 |
2.33 |
| 娛樂 Entertainment |
6.02 |
1.77 |
| 儲蓄 Savings |
6.02 |
16.46 |
| 稅、利息 Taxes, interest |
0.00 |
3.45 |
| 匯款 Remittances |
6.02 |
0.00 |
| 其他 Other |
0.00 |
6.14 |
|
|
|
| 中華人民共和國所面對的挑戰是，如何在短時間內採取適切的方法以實踐四個現代化計畫（「第五個」現代化當然不在考慮之列），而解決之道是讓中國向國際金融圈開放。似乎是來自廣東省的兩批官員率先向鄧小平提出設立「特區」的概念，藉以發展該省獨特的經濟資源。中國政治有許多層面是如此隱約晦澀，我們只能合理的推斷，鄧小平派遣這兩人前往廣東，表面上他們好像在為自己所屬的省份爭取有利的政策主張，其實卻是呼應了鄧小平本人的意圖。鄧小平於一九七九年四月召開的中央委員會工作會議上大力闡揚特區的觀念，此時中、越戰爭剛結束，國內示威抗議運動也趨於沉寂。於是，一組工作隊前往南方沿海省份廣東、福建兩省，一九七九年七月，中央委員會提案設置四個「出口特區」。翌年，「出口特區」更名為「經濟特區」，藉以進一步彰顯特區所涵蓋的廣泛經濟活動範圍，或許這還有與臺灣「加工出口區」加以區隔的用意。
|
The challenge for
the PRC was to adopt some means for implementing the Four Modernizations
(the "fifth" was not in question here) at a swifter rate, and
one that would gain China freer access to the world financial
community. It seems to have been two party officials from Guangdong
who first suggested to Deng Xiaoping the idea of instituting
"special zones" that would be used to develop the particular
economic resources of their province. So secretive were many
aspects of Chinese politics, however, that it has been plausibly
suggested that Deng sent these two men to Guangdong so that
they could then seem to be urging their own province's claims
when in fact they were echoing Deng's own intentions. In either
case, Deng Xiaoping pushed the idea at a work conference of
the Central Committee in April, 1979, when the brief China-Vietnam
war had ended and the democratic protestors been largely silenced.
A work team was accordingly sent to the two south coastal provinces
of Guangdong and Fujian, and in July 1979 the Central Committee
moved to establish four "special zones for export." The following
year the name was changed to "special economic zones" to suggest
their broader range of economic activity, and perhaps to make
them sound less like Taiwan's "export processing zones."
|
| 經過慎重挑選的這四個地區，主要著眼點是這些地區比鄰外國資本來源，且出入便利。珠海鄰近澳門，深圳地處香港北方邊界，汕頭、廈門與臺灣相望。十九世紀英國人使用羅馬拼音方式所稱之為「Swatow」（汕頭）、「Amoy」（廈門），均是昔日大國強迫清廷開放的條約港口。揮之不去的帝國主義者幽靈容或帶來些許的困擾，不過時移勢易，今日中國領導人似乎有信心通過中國人強而有力的控制與監督，來避免外國人對這些地區的主宰。然而，這四個地區所提供給外國人和海外華人的優惠措施仍是十分可觀的。中華人民共和國針對外國投資者的企畫內容建造所需的廠房提供受過訓練（或許還包括服從性強以及並未從屬於任何工會組織）、薪資低廉的勞動力。中華人民共和國政府亦提供優惠的稅率和多項金融誘因，其中還包括該經濟特區交通運輸網絡的建設。
|
The four areas were
carefully chosen for their proximity to foreign-cap- ital sources
and their accessibility. Zhuhai is adjacent to Macao, Shenzhen
just over the northern border of Hong Kong, Shantou and Xiamen
are opposite Taiwan. In their nineteenth-century British romanizations,
Shan- tou (Swatow) and Xiamen (Amoy) had been among the treaty
ports forced on the Qing dynasty by the British. Those imperialist
echoes might have bothered some, but China's leaders seem to
have been confident they could avoid foreign dominance over
these zones by vigorously maintaining Chinese control and supervision.
Nevertheless, the facilities extended to foreigners and overseas
Chinese in the four zones were considerable. The PRC offered
to build plants to the specifications of foreign investors,
and provide a well- trained (and presumably obedient and nonunionized)
labor force at competitively low wages. They also offered investors
preferential tax rates and a number of other financial incentives,
including the development of transportation networks in the
zones.
|
| 投資者確實有所回應，但速度並不如中國人的預期，來的也不是中國人原先希冀的先進技術。中國勞動力的技術層次不符外國投資者的期望，官僚作風仍是行政運作的障礙，幹部素質普遍低落。經濟特區的確開始起飛，特別是深圳，它的發展幾乎是其比鄰高成長型之香港經濟結構中次要部門的翻版，但對中華人民共和國的計畫官僚而言，經濟特區崛起的代價所費不貲，因為計畫官僚必須在經濟特區投入遠超過他們預期的龐大建設資金，構築其他相關的配套制度。而且，深圳地區進口商品以驚人的速度成長，也令計畫官僚感到詑異。同時，一連串的社會問題開始在經濟特區浮現，例如港幣的流通，黑市的產生，官僚的腐敗，街頭犯罪與操持淫業。中國政府高層領導人──其中部分領導人或許已警覺到隱伏在鄧小平雄心萬丈計畫中的潛在問題──開始憂慮變革的速度與範圍。
|
Investors did respond,
but not as quickly as the Chinese had hoped, nor with the commitment
of advanced technology that had been expected. The Chinese work
force was often not as skilled as the foreign investors had
hoped, the bureaucracy remained cumbersome, and quality standards
were low. The zones did take off--especially Shenzhen, which
grew to look almost like the less affluent sectors of its high-rise
neighbor, Hong Kong-- but the boom was expensive to PRC planners,
who had to invest far more state funds in construction and other
support systems than they had expected. The planners were surprised
too when imports into Shenzhen grew at an alarming rate. At
the same time, a maze of social problems began to appear in
the zones, from the regular use of Hong Kong currency, black
markets, and corruption among officials to street crime and
prostitution. High government leaders in China--some perhaps
already wary of Deng Xiaoping's ambitious plans--began to grow
anxious about the accelerated pace of change.
|
| 早在一九七九年七月，全國人民代表大會即大聲疾呼調整經濟步調，重新關注農業部門，並建議謹慎、穩健處理四個現代化中其餘三個領域的改革問題。資深的經濟計畫官僚陳雲於一九七九年進入中央委員會政治局的常務委員會，稍後於翌年要求中國經濟進入治理整頓時期。這項決策的理由之一是中共發現，縱然經濟成長的預期榮景令人振奮，經濟特區的潛在利潤仍然可期，但一九七九至一九八○年中國的外貿逆差攀升至三十九億美元，這是中國有史以來最龐大的貿易赤字。整合進由技術先進貿易國所構成的世界體系中，顯然是一項代價昂貴的交易。
|
As early as July 1979
the National People's Congress had argued for readjusting the
economy to pay more attention once again to agriculture, and
suggested caution over the other three of the Four Modernizations.The
veteran economic planner Chen Yun, raised to the Standing Committee
of the Central Committee's Politburo in 1979, called late the
following year for a period of retrenchment. One factor in this
decision was the discovery that, exciting though the prospects
for economic growth might be, and however potentially profitable
the special economic zones, the foreign-trade deficit for the
year 1979-1980 had turned out to be $3.9 billion, by far the
largest in China's history. Integration into the world of technologically
advanced trading nations was clearly going to be an expensive
business.
|
| 一九七九年四月二十三日，《人民日報》刊載了中華人民共和國迄今為止所揭露之最嚴重的貪污弊案，這類弊案的嚴重性程度容或有不同，但結局同樣是沸沸揚揚。一名名叫王守信的共產黨中級幹部，與一群同樣擁有黨、政職務的同事於黑龍江省內供職，在超過七年時間的一連串貪瀆案件中，至少盜用了國家財產五十三萬六千元人民幣。王守信的案子牽連甚廣，涉及了她所管理的燃料公司與其相關的分配制度。這件案子引起了劉賓雁的興趣，劉是中國當時最敏銳作家之一，曾於反右鬥爭與文化大革命運動期間因直言敢諫而遭受迫害。一九七○年代末，「調查報導」的專業素養往往被用來作為抒發不滿貪官污吏民怨的管道，而劉賓雁則是把這樣的角色發揮得淋漓盡致，縱使他身處於國家機制箝制出版事業的中國世界裡。劉賓雁前往黑龍江省訪問王守信單位裡的人，試圖爬梳這件案子的始末。題目為〈人妖之間〉、六十頁的傑出報告文學，刊載於一九七九年九月的《人民文學》雜誌上。由於這是一份「官方期刊」，中國共產黨文化當局顯然是認可劉賓雁對黨內部份不肖幹部的控訴。
|
At a different level
of magnitude, but equally disturbing in its way, was the announcement
in People's Daily on April 23, 1979, of the worst case of corruption
yet uncovered in the PRC. A CCP middle-level cadre named Wang
Shouxin. working in northerly Heilongjiang province with a group
of associates, many of whom also held party and bureaucratic
positions, had managed to embezzle state property worth at least
536,000 yuan in a series of scams and thefts spread over seven
years. Wang Shouxin's case was a convoluted one, involving her
manipulation of the coal company she supervised and the distribution
system that went with it. The case attracted the attention of
one of China's shrewdest writers, Liu Binyan, who had suffered
in the antirightist campaign and the Cultural Revolution for
his out-spokenness. The profession of "investigative reporter"
was, in the late 1970s, being encouraged as one way of airing
popular complaints against corrupt cadres, and Liu was a dramatic
example of how effective such a role could be, even in the world
of China's state-controlled press. He traveled to Heilongjiang
to interview people in Wang's unit and to try and unravel the
details of the case. His remarkable expose, a sixty-page essay
that he entitled "People or Monsters," was published in People's
Literature in September 1979. Since this was an "official journal,"
the CCP cultural authorities obviously agreed with Liu's basic
indictment of certain echelons within the CCP itself.
|
| 在劉賓雁冷嘲熱諷的描述中，王守信是一位「感情豐富、愛憎鮮明的女人。她手裡這幾萬噸煤和九輛汽車，就是她的筆和墨，她每天書寫著的抒情詩篇。」然而王守信所譜寫的詩篇是用來為她自己的家人牟利，以及通過選擇性的操縱與賄賂去迎合各級黨員、幹部所好。劉賓雁順道提及，王守信其實並不特別，只是王的案子株連甚廣而顯得非比尋常。王守信僅是一個徵候，一個不誠實的人，她的行為經年累月地包藏著「社會風氣的敗壞，非法活動的逐漸合法化，對於道德淪喪現象逐漸習以為常」。假若王守信的確僅是一個先兆，並非是孤立的個案，那麼中國向西方世界開放所帶來的就不只是機會，接踵而至的還有數不盡的誘惑。
|
Wang Shouxin, in Liu's
sardonic portrayal, was "a warmly sentimental woman with clearly
defined likes and dislikes. Her tens of thousands of tons of
coal and her nine trucks were the brush and ink that she used
everyday to compose her lyric poems." The "poems" that Wang
composed were designed to protect and promote her own family,
and to ingratiate herself with party members and cadres at all
levels through selective manipulation and corruption. Wang was
not in fact so special, Liu observed in passing; only the scale
of her operations was unusual. She was merely a symptom, a dishonest
person whose behavior had for years been "covered up by the
general decline in social morality, by the gradual legalization
of criminal activity, and by the people's gradual acclimatization
to the moral decay around them. " If Wang was indeed a symptom
rather than an isolated case, then the opening up of China to
the West was going to offer as many temptations as opportunities.#12;
|
